

Dynamics of Changes in the Representative Structure in the MPR RI Post-Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and Its Implications for the Function of the State Representative Institution

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Abstract: *This study examines the dynamics of changes in the representative structure in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) of the Republic of Indonesia after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, especially related to the elimination of the Group Representative element in MPR membership. This change has a significant impact on the existence of the MPR as a state representative institution, both in relation to its role and function in the Indonesian state system. This study aims to analyze the implications of the elimination of the Group Representative on the function of people's representation, as well as its impact on the legislative process and political decision-making in Indonesia. With a legal analysis approach, this study reveals how these changes reflect the evolution of the representative system in Indonesia and assess whether the MPR can still carry out its functions effectively in the context of post-reform democracy.*

Keywords: *MPR RI, amendment to the 1945 Constitution, Group Representative*

INTRODUCTION

Before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) occupied the highest position in the Indonesian state system (Estiko, 2021). As the highest state institution, the MPR has broad authority, including determining the General Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN), appointing and dismissing the President and Vice President, and being a complete representation of all elements of the nation. In this position, the MPR is seen as the embodiment of full people's sovereignty, which in practice makes the President a mandate of the MPR, not a direct holder of the people's mandate through general elections (Badan Pengkajian MPR RI, 2019). Consequently, the structure of state power became very centralized in this institution and reflected the spirit of guided democracy as formulated by the nation's founders after independence.

The membership structure of the MPR before the amendment consisted of members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) plus regional and group representatives. Regional delegates are representatives from each province, while group delegates are filled by figures from various functional groups in society such as religious organizations, professions, women, laborers, and other groups considered to have a strategic role in national development. (Akbar, 2002) This group delegate element is intended to strengthen the principle of representative deliberation in decision-making, as inspired by the spirit of Pancasila democracy which is not only based on geographical representation but also functional and social representation. This composition normatively describes a model of representation that is typical of Indonesia, which is different from the liberal parliamentary system which is based entirely on elections.

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In its role as the implementer of people's sovereignty, the MPR has a strategic function in determining the direction of development and state politics. The MPR not only functions as a legislative forum but also as an ideological and symbolic institution of national unity. Determining the GBHN and appointing the President is a concrete form of the MPR's role as the main director of state policy. (Nazriyah, 2017) In addition, with its membership consisting of various elements of society, the MPR is considered capable of voicing national interests comprehensively. However, in practice, the dominance of power in the hands of the MPR also raises the issue of imbalance in checks and balances, because this institution does not have an adequate political accountability mechanism to the people directly. (Wierdarini, 2018) It later became one of the basic ideas in pushing for constitutional change in the reform era.

The amending of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which took place in four stages between 1999 and 2002 became an important milestone in the history of Indonesian state administration. This amendment was a response to the demands for reform that emerged due to the multidimensional crisis at the end of the New Order regime. One of the main issues on the agenda for this change was the need to limit power and strengthen democratic principles. (Isra, 2020) In this case, the structure and function of the MPR as the highest state institution were also in the spotlight. The amendment not only changed the position of the MPR from the highest state institution to a high state institution on a par with other institutions but also fundamentally overhauled the composition of its membership. (Agustiwi & Asri, 2014)

One of the most striking changes is the elimination of the existence of the Group Representatives from the MPR membership structure. After the amendment, the MPR only consists of members of the DPR and members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) who are all elected through general elections. This step reflects a paradigm shift from functional representation to electoral representation, where the legitimacy of membership in the legislative institution comes entirely from the people's votes through direct democracy mechanisms. This decision was taken with the consideration of strengthening the principle of people's sovereignty and avoiding the practice of political co-optation which during the New Order was carried out through the appointment of certain group figures who tended to represent the interests of the central government (Rannie, 2017).

However, this change also raises questions about the extent to which Indonesia's post-amendment representation system is still able to accommodate the diversity of social, cultural, and professional interests of the Indonesian people which were previously channeled through the Group Representatives. Although the elimination of this element aims to encourage a more transparent and accountable electoral democracy, in practice there are concerns that strategic groups outside the majority political power will lose their space for formal participation in the decision-making process at the national level. This shows that changes in the structure of the MPR are not only administrative or technical, but also touch on the philosophical and ideological aspects of the concept of representation in the Indonesian democratic system (Kusumaningtyas, 2018).

The elimination of the Utusan Golongan (Group Envoy) element from the membership of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) is part of the constitutional reform efforts to create a more democratic and accountable representative system. The main reason for this elimination is the desire to eliminate representation practices not based on general elections, which are considered vulnerable to political manipulation and co-optation by the executive power. In the practice of the New Order era, many Utusan Golongan positions were filled through appointment mechanisms, not elections, so they were considered not to directly reflect the people's aspirations (Haryadi, 2018). Therefore, the reform emphasizes the importance of

electoral legitimacy as the basis for membership of representative institutions, including the MPR, to strengthen the principle of true people's sovereignty.

Although this decision is in line with the spirit of electoral democracy, the elimination of Utusan Golongan has raised pros and cons from various groups. On the positive side, this step is seen as progress in building a more open political system, where representation in legislative institutions depends on the voice of the people, not on proximity to power. However, ideologically, some parties consider that this elimination ignores the characteristics of the Pancasila democratic system which from the beginning was designed to accommodate not only a territorial representation and political parties but also functional groups in society. Groups such as professional organizations, religious institutions, or indigenous communities lose their formal channels to contribute to the national political process, which they previously had through seats in the MPR as Group Representatives. (Alsidik Syahputra, 2015)

In the post-amendment system, political representation shifted entirely to two chambers: the DPR based on political parties and the DPD based on regions. The question then is, is this new structure still able to represent the diversity of interests of society as a whole? Political reality shows that non-partisan groups—such as academics, cultural figures, traditional figures, and religious leaders—no longer have direct access to be involved in the legislative process or strategic decision-making in the MPR. As a result, minority voices and special interests previously represented through the Utusan Golongan channel must now seek alternative channels, either through participation in political parties, non-governmental organizations, or public advocacy channels. It raises critical questions about the inclusiveness of Indonesia's representative system and whether majoritarian electoral democracy can truly guarantee fair representation for all levels of society (Dapu, 2014).

Changes in the MPR membership structure after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution have caused fundamental changes to the representative function of the institution. By only consisting of members of the DPR and DPD who are elected through elections, an important question arises: does the MPR still reflect the representation of all elements of the nation? Before the amendment, the existence of the Utusan Golongan allowed direct representation of strategic groups that were not affiliated with political parties or geographical structures. Now, this representation is entirely handed over to the electoral mechanism that is oriented towards the majority vote, which does not always provide enough space for minority groups, Indigenous communities, or certain professions. As a result, the MPR as a state institution that used to be a reflection of the nation's diversity, now resembles more of an aggregation of political power and regional interests competing in electoral contests (Erlina, 2015).

The implications of this change are felt in three main aspects: political legitimacy, the legislative process, and constitutional decision-making. Normatively, the legitimacy of the MPR becomes stronger because all its members are directly elected by the people. However, substantively, this legitimacy becomes narrow because not all groups in society are able to compete in a very competitive and expensive election system. In the context of legislation and strategic decision-making—such as changes to the Constitution—the loss of functional representation from certain groups may weaken the depth and diversity of perspectives brought into the MPR forum. It can affect the quality of national policy because not all community interests are channeled equally, especially those from marginalized groups or those less organized in electoral politics.

The next question is whether the DPR and DPD are sufficient to represent all the people's interests in the new system. The DPR, which is dominated by political parties, often

focuses more on party agendas and pragmatic political calculations, while the DPD, which should represent regional interests, has not been fully effective due to its limited legislative authority. In this condition, the MPR's representative function becomes less inclusive than before the amendment. Many community groups feel they do not have a formal channel to voice their interests at the national level, so trust in state representative institutions can be eroded. Therefore, although the MPR has become more democratic in a procedural sense, its effectiveness as an institution that represents the entire spectrum of Indonesian society is still an issue that deserves to be studied and evaluated in depth (Riyadi, 2012).

The urgency of this research lies in the importance of re-examining the representative structure of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Indonesia's post-reform democratic system that continues to develop. The constitutional changes that eliminated the element of the Group Representatives have had a significant impact on the way the state represents the diversity of society in legislative institutions. In a situation where political parties are the only formal channel of representation, concerns have arisen that non-partisan strategic groups are losing space to directly articulate their interests in the national political process. This research is relevant as a scientific effort to assess the extent to which the new MPR structure is able to maintain the integrity of the representative system and ensure fair and equitable representation for all elements of society. Moreover, this study is vital to understand whether the transformation brings the people closer to the center of state decision-making, or creates a new distance that is invisible but has a real impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of representative institutions in the modern Indonesian constitutional system.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses a normative legal method, namely an approach that relies on an analysis of applicable legal norms as a basis for understanding and assessing changes in the membership structure of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution. The approaches used include a legislative approach, which aims to examine the legal provisions governing the structure and function of the MPR before and after the amendment; a philosophical approach, to trace the basic values underlying the formation of a representative system in Indonesia; and a conceptual approach, to examine theories of representation and democracy that are relevant to the context of the changes. The data sources in this study are primary legal materials, such as the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and related laws and regulations, as well as secondary legal materials, such as books, scientific journals, legal articles, and other official documents that discuss the structure of the MPR and the representative system. Data collection techniques are carried out through library research, which allows researchers to examine and critique various legal documents and academic literature. The data analysis technique is carried out qualitatively by interpreting the contents of legal norms and linking them to legal theories and constitutional principles to produce argumentative and reflective conclusions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Changes in the Membership Structure of the MPR RI Post-Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Specifically Regarding the Elimination of Group Representatives

Article 2 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) confirms the membership structure of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which since the amendment has been regulated so that the MPR consists of members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD), who are elected through general elections. This regulation is further explained in the law

governing the implementation of elections (Sagala, 2012). This change means that since the 2004 Election, MPR membership no longer includes the Group Representative element, previously part of the MPR structure. In other words, post-amendment, only members of the DPR and DPD are part of the MPR, which eliminates the system of representation of certain groups previously represented by Group Representatives. (Rohmat, 2016) This illustrates a fundamental change in the structure of the MPR which was previously more inclusive of social and functional diversity in society.

The position of the MPR before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution was positioned as the highest state institution, with very broad and centralized powers. (Yulistyowati, 2016) However, along with the reform and changes to the 1945 Constitution, this position has undergone significant changes. Article 3 of the 1945 Constitution which regulates the authority of the MPR, both in amending and establishing the Constitution and in inaugurating and dismissing the President and Vice President, shows the strategic role of the MPR in the past. Although it still has great authority, the position of the MPR as the highest state institution was abolished, and replaced with the concept that state sovereignty lies in the hands of the people, which is implemented by the Constitution. (Tutik, 2013) This change reflects a shift from a more centralized system to a more democratic system, where the highest power is no longer in the hands of the MPR as a state institution, but is implemented by the people through a more direct democratic mechanism.

The reforms carried out in 1999-2002 brought major changes to the structure of the Indonesian state. (Widayati, 2016) One of the significant changes in the amendment to the 1945 Constitution was the elimination of the MPR as the highest state institution. Previously, the MPR was considered an institution that directly represented the sovereignty of the people, with a role to supervise and control the running of the government. However, with the amendment, the MPR is no longer positioned as the highest institution in the state system, and its position is equal to other state institutions. The predicate of the MPR as the highest state institution has been abolished, and the highest power previously in the hands of the MPR has been transferred to the people through general elections and a more democratic representative system. This shift aims to improve the Indonesian state system, restore the true sovereignty of the people, and reduce the dominance of the MPR in the government structure.

The fundamental change in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution was the shift in its position from an institution that originally implemented the sovereignty of the people, to an institution with a more limited role. Some describe the new MPR as a kind of "joint session" between members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD), integrated in one forum, without the status of an independent or sovereign institution. After the amendment, the MPR's authority was significantly narrowed, with the MPR only having one routine authority, namely inaugurating the President and Vice President elected in the general election. This authority is exercised every five years. Meanwhile, the MPR's other authorities are more incidental and are only exercised in certain situations, such as to amend and stipulate the Constitution, dismiss the President and Vice President during their term of office, or fill the vacant positions of President and Vice President if both are permanently incapacitated, as regulated in Article 3 paragraphs (1) and (3) and Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution.

The difference between routine and incidental authority is important to understand. Routine authority, namely the inauguration of the President and Vice President, must be carried out periodically every five years after the election. In contrast, incidental authority is only carried out when there are conditions that require an MPR decision, such as a change to the

constitution or decision-making regarding the dismissal of the President and Vice President, which only occurs if there is a violation of the law or their inability to carry out their duties. In this context, the role of the MPR as an institution that has great authority in regulating the running of government is no longer as high as before. The MPR is no longer an institution that holds state sovereignty directly, but rather an institution with limited authority and is related to certain extraordinary situations.

The repositioning of the MPR after this amendment confused its position in the Indonesian state structure. The MPR, which now consists only of a combination of DPR and DPD members elected through general elections, is no longer positioned as the sole institution that exercises the highest state authority. Article 2 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution after the amendment positions the MPR as a "combination" of members of the DPR and DPD in one joint session, not as a bicameral institution consisting of two legislative chambers that have their authority. It confuses the understanding of the MPR's authority structure because it seems as if the MPR's authority is only an accumulation of the authority that already exists in the DPR and DPD. In other words, the MPR no longer has independent and separate authority from the two institutions, but rather functions as a meeting or joint forum between members of the DPR and DPD.

In the provisions of Article 3 of the amended 1945 Constitution, the MPR's authority is no longer combined with the authority of the DPR and DPD, but rather becomes a separate authority and is regulated independently. The MPR no longer functions as an institution that has the combined authority of the two legislative institutions, but as an institution that has limited authority as a permanent institution, which only carries out certain tasks by the provisions contained in the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, although in practice the MPR consists of a combination of members of the DPR and DPD, its position still cannot be considered entirely as a "joint session" or as a "permanent body" that has full authority like other legislative institutions. The position of the MPR after the amendment, with its limited authority, shows that this institution no longer has a very dominant position in the Indonesian state structure.

After the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the membership structure of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) underwent significant changes. The MPR now consists of members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD), who are elected through general elections. This system eliminates the element of the Group Representatives that were previously part of the MPR. Before the amendment, the membership of the MPR consisted of three elements: members of the DPR who represent the people, members of the DPD who represent the regions, and Group Representatives who represent various interest groups in society. With the elimination of the Group Representatives, the MPR now consists of only two components: the DPR, which focuses on political representation, and the DPD, which represents regions in Indonesia. It creates a significant change in the composition of MPR members who no longer directly reflect various groups or specific interests in society.

The mechanism for selecting MPR members after the amendment relies entirely on general elections held every five years, with the election of DPR and DPD members being performed directly by the people. The election provides stronger electoral legitimacy than before because MPR members are now fully elected by the people through a transparent democratic system. These direct elections give the people full authority to determine their representatives, both at the national level through the DPR and at the regional level through the DPD. This strengthens the principle of popular sovereignty in the Indonesian constitutional system because all MPR members are now elected based on the people's votes and not appointed based on certain groups. This strengthens political representation in Indonesia,

although it also means that the MPR no longer has elements that represent non-political groups or groups that previously could articulate the interests of society that were not accommodated by political parties.

The elimination of the Group Representatives has several reasons that can be understood from a political, legal, and sociological perspective. Politically, the elimination of the Group Representatives is seen as an effort to strengthen a more democratic representative system that focuses on the voice of the people, considering that the assumption that groups of groups are more often used as political tools for certain interests than as the voice of society as a whole. Legally, this abolition is based on equality in a democratic system, where no group is superior or given more priority than another group in the legislative process. From a sociological perspective, this abolition is also considered to reflect social change that leads to greater appreciation for broader representation of the people, as well as a decrease in dependence on old structures that are considered no longer relevant to the ever-evolving social and political dynamics of Indonesia.

However, the elimination of the Utusan Golongan also has implications for the balance of representation in the Indonesian constitutional system. Without the existence of the Utusan Golongan, certain interest groups that are not directly represented by political parties may feel that they do not have a channel to convey their aspirations in the MPR forum. This could lead to dissatisfaction from these groups, who feel that the new system favors dominant political forces and provides less space for existing social diversity. On the other hand, this elimination is also considered a step towards strengthening a purer democracy, where representation is more focused on the voice of the majority of the people and reduces the dominance of certain groups that may have been more politically organized.

Pro-partisan views on this decision usually argue that by eliminating the Utusan Golongan, Indonesia can create a simpler representation system that is more focused on the will of the people, without intervention from groups that often do not reflect the wishes of the majority. They believe that with only two representative institutions (DPR and DPD), the representative system will be more effective and transparent. Conversely, the opposing view states that the elimination of the Utusan Golongan eliminates channels for the voices of minorities or groups that are not represented by the main political parties. They argue that a more inclusive system, as existed before the amendment, provides an opportunity for various groups to voice their interests at the national level, creates balance in political decision-making, and prevents domination by the majority political group. These differing views indicate the tension between the idealism of direct democracy and the need to involve all levels of society in the political process.

Before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the MPR had a more complex structure and included three important elements: members of the DPR, members of the DPD, and the Group Representatives. These Group Representatives provided space for certain interest groups, including social, religious, and professional organizations, to be involved in the legislative process and decision-making. The MPR was also seen as the highest state institution, with great authority to amend and establish the Constitution, and had the authority to inaugurate and dismiss the President and Vice President. The MPR, which consisted of various elements, was considered more representative in accommodating the diverse interests of society. However, this structure also had weaknesses, namely being vulnerable to the influence of certain political groups that could distort the aspirations of the people as a whole, as well as adding complexity to more fragmented decision-making. In addition, the influence of the

Group Representatives that do not always reflect the interests of the people directly makes the MPR less transparent and tends not to be in line with the principles of pure democracy.

After the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the structure of the MPR was simplified, consisting only of elected members of the DPR and DPD through general elections. This system focuses on a more direct and transparent representation of the people, with the authority of the MPR limited to the inauguration of the President and Vice President and incidental decision-making, such as changing and establishing the Constitution. Electoral legitimacy becomes stronger because MPR members are now fully elected by the people through general elections, reducing the dominance of certain groups. The advantages of this new system are the simplicity and purity of democracy is easier to understand and more focused on the voice of the majority of the people. However, the disadvantage is the loss of representation from certain groups previously represented by the Group Representatives, which can make some minority voices or certain groups feel unaccommodated in the political process. Overall, although the new system can increase the effectiveness of the MPR in carrying out its functions democratically, there are concerns that some unrepresented groups may feel marginalized, thereby reducing the overall representativeness of this institution.

Political and Legal Dynamics Underlying Changes in the Representation Structure in the MPR

Post-reformasi 1998, Indonesia experienced significant changes in its political and social situation. The fall of the New Order regime and the end of authoritarian rule opened up a great opportunity for a more democratic and transparent political system renewal. The reform movement demanded structural changes in government, including limiting executive power, strengthening the legislature, and creating a fairer representative system. One of the main issues was the shift in political representation, which was previously dominated by elite groups and certain interests, to a system that brought the people's voices closer to the political process. These demands led to an awareness of the importance of strengthening people's representation in state institutions, which gave rise to a push to overhaul the state structure, including changing the composition and authority of the MPR as the highest state institution. This reform aims to create a more inclusive and democratic system of government, while reducing the dominance of certain powers that have so far been centered on political elites.

Before the amendment, the MPR had a very strong position and was considered an institution that could threaten the principles of democracy. As the highest state institution, the MPR has significant authority, including changing the Constitution and inaugurating and dismissing the President. The existence of the Group Representatives in the MPR structure is considered one of the causes of public dissatisfaction with the existing representation system. Group Representatives who are not directly elected by the people often represent the interests of certain groups and political elites rather than the aspirations of the wider community. Political practices that developed during the New Order era worsened this situation, where the MPR tended to become a political tool for the authorities to strengthen control over the state. This lack of transparency added to the crisis of public trust in the MPR institution, which was no longer able to carry out its function as an institution that truly represents the people.

The amending of the 1945 Constitution began in 1999 to 2002 involved various groups, including reform figures, politicians, and civil society who wanted improvements in the Indonesian state system. One of the main objectives of this amendment was to form a more democratic, transparent, and accountable government system, by reducing the role of the MPR which was too dominant. One important change was the removal of Group Representatives from MPR membership, which was considered a step to emphasize more on direct representation of the people through the DPR and DPD. The reason behind the elimination of

the Group Representatives is to reduce the interference of political elites and certain groups in the decision-making process, which has often created injustice and not reflected the wishes of the majority of the people.

The legal considerations underlying the elimination of Group Representatives in the MPR membership reflect an effort to align the representative structure with the basic principles of democracy, equality, and fairer representation. Within the legal framework, the elimination of Group Representatives is considered an important step to eliminate indirect representation, which has been feared to represent the interests of certain groups or factions are indirectly elected by the people. As an institution that should represent the people, the MPR must reflect the will and aspirations of the people directly. Therefore, elements that are not elected through the general election mechanism, such as Group Representatives, are considered to be contrary to the principle of equality of votes and the principle of democracy that demands more transparent and direct representation from the people. This adjustment is by Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution which stipulates that sovereignty lies in the hands of the people and is implemented according to the Constitution, emphasizing that people's representation must be based on the voice of the people themselves, not on the representation of certain factions or factions.

Legal analysis of the elimination of the Group Representatives shows that their existence has been contrary to the basic principles of democracy and direct representation. Article 22E paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, which regulates general elections for the DPR and DPD, shows that only institutions that have legitimate electoral authority and are directly elected by the people can consider themselves legitimate representatives. The existence of the Group Representatives, which were previously appointed based on certain considerations by the President or certain groups, does not reflect the voice of the majority of the people. This causes injustice in representation, where small groups or political elites have a greater voice than the citizens. Therefore, the elimination of the Group Representatives is considered a form of adjustment to the principle of democracy that prioritizes the direct voting rights of the people, by the spirit of reform that demands a more open government based on the will of the people.

The political dynamics that influence decision-making regarding changes to the structure of the MPR are closely related to the development of Indonesian politics post-reform. After the fall of the New Order regime, Indonesia experienced a major shift in democratic practices and governance. One of the main demands of the reform movement was to create a more democratic, transparent, and accountable system of government, by limiting the power of state institutions that were previously too dominant. In this case, the MPR as an institution that has great power and does not fully reflect the will of the people is considered necessary to be changed. The process of amending the 1945 Constitution involving various political elements, academics, and civil society focused on the need to eliminate elements that hinder fairer and more transparent representation. Changing the structure of the MPR by eliminating the Group Representatives is one of the important points in this effort, to ensure that only institutions directly elected by the people have a say in making important state decisions. The role of political parties and reform figures is very large in driving this change. Political parties that emerged after the reformation have a strong commitment to changing the old political structure and creating a more accountable and transparent system. Reform figures who fought for this change argued that to strengthen the democratic system, political representation must be based on direct and open elections, not through mechanisms that involve the appointment of certain groups. In addition, the political dynamics that occurred in the post-reform Indonesian

government system, which was marked by increasing demands for a more democratic government system, also became a factor that urged this change. Awareness of the importance of more direct representation of the people encouraged changes in the structure of the MPR, both before and after the amendment, to eliminate practices that had previously prioritized elite groups and replace them with a more inclusive and democratic system.

The conflict and pros and cons regarding the elimination of the *Utusan Golongan* in the MPR structure reflect significant differences of opinion regarding the principle of political representation and the effectiveness of representative institutions. Supporters of the *Utusan Golongan* elimination argue that this change is a step forward in strengthening the principle of democracy, because only institutions directly elected by the people are legitimate in representing the will of the people. They believe that the elimination of groups that are not directly elected can reduce the potential influence of political elites who do not reflect the voice of the majority of the people. In addition, they also argue that a representative system that is entirely based on general elections will be more transparent and accountable. On the other hand, those who oppose the elimination of the *Utusan Golongan* argue that this elimination can reduce the diversity of voices in the MPR, especially in accommodating the interests of groups or groups that are not directly represented by members of the DPR or DPD. They are also concerned that this system will only worsen political polarization, where large groups with majority support will dominate, while the interests of minority groups or certain groups will be neglected. Therefore, they argue that *Utusan Golongan* acts as a channel for aspirations that may not be accommodated in direct elections.

The long-term impact of the elimination of *Utusan Golongan* on the Indonesian political and state system is very complex and can be felt in various aspects. Positively, by eliminating the representation of groups that are not directly elected, the representative system becomes more democratic, reflecting the broader voice of the people, and decreasing the elites influence are not represented by direct elections. It can strengthen the political legitimacy of the MPR and facilitate a more representative legislative process. However, the negative impact is that the elimination of the *Utusan Golongan* can lead to a lack of diversity in representation, especially for groups that are not reached by the direct election system, such as marginalized groups or those with limited influence. Thus, although the new representation structure is more democratic, the challenge of ensuring that the voices of minority groups are still heard at the national level remains an important issue that needs to be considered. In the long term, this system can deepen political polarization, by increasing the dominance of the majority group and reducing the space for diversity in the Indonesian political process.

Implications of the Elimination of Group Representative Elements in the MPR Structure on the Representative Function and Political Decision Making in the Indonesian State System

Following the elimination of the Group Representatives in the MPR structure, the representative function of the MPR has undergone significant changes in reflecting the diversity and aspirations of all elements of Indonesian society. Previously, the Group Representatives played a role in representing the interests of certain groups or factions that were not represented by members of the DPR or DPD, creating space for minority voices or factions with special interests. With the elimination of this element, the MPR now relies entirely on members of the DPR and DPD who are directly elected through general elections, which reflect the majority vote. However, this can also raise concerns that minority groups or factions, who do not have broad support in direct elections, will have difficulty gaining equal representation in the new system. Therefore, even though the new structure is more democratic,

the challenge of ensuring that the MPR continues to reflect all elements of Indonesian society is considerable, especially in ensuring that the diversity of voices is accommodated.

The DPR and DPD are expected to replace the role of the Group Representatives in creating a more inclusive and equitable representation. The DPR, which represents the interests of the people through direct elections, has a stronger role in accommodating the diversity of political aspirations of the community. The DPD, although it does not have the same legislative powers as the DPR, represents regional interests and can provide a broader voice for regional interests at the national level. However, the merger of the two in the MPR after the amendment does not fully guarantee that all groups, especially smaller or less organized ones, will get sufficient representation. On the one hand, this system increases legitimacy because they are directly elected by the people, but on the other hand, it can be more difficult for marginalized groups to penetrate the dominance of the majority vote. Therefore, although in theory the DPR and DPD can replace the role of the Group Representatives, in reality this requires more effort to ensure that more inclusive representation can be achieved without providing space for marginalized groups.

The elimination of Group Representatives in the MPR structure has complex implications for the legitimacy of the MPR as a legitimate institution that represents the will of the people. On the one hand, this change can increase the legitimacy of the MPR because all of its members are now directly elected by the people through general elections, which strengthens the principle of democracy and reduces the opportunity for intervention by certain groups that are not directly elected. By eliminating elements that were previously not democratically elected, many argue that the MPR is now more transparent and accountable in carrying out its duties, which could improve public trust in this institution. However, on the other hand, the elimination of the Group Representatives could also reduce the legitimacy of the MPR in terms of diversity representation. Without special representation from marginalized groups or those that have received less attention from the direct election system, the MPR could be seen as less reflective of all levels of society, especially minority groups that are not politically strong enough.

The post-amendment MPR, which only consists of members of the DPR and DPD, has stronger legitimacy in representing the people directly through general elections. However, although formally this institution is more democratic, this change does not necessarily increase public trust in the MPR and other state institutions. The presence of the Group Representatives, although it seems undemocratic, has given a voice to groups not represented in direct elections, such as certain professional, religious, and social groups. The absence of this element after the amendment could reduce the sense of inclusivity, which in turn could reduce public trust in the MPR's ability to reflect all interests. The impact of these changes on public trust will depend on how the DPR and DPD can balance representation between the interests of the majority and smaller groups, and how the MPR can prove its ability to accommodate the diversity of people's voices in political decision-making at the national level.

The elimination of the Group Representatives in the MPR structure has had a significant impact on the political decision-making process in Indonesia, especially in the context of changes to the Constitution, presidential elections, and the dismissal of the president. Before the amendment, the Group Representatives were considered to have an important role in representing the interests of certain groups that were not covered in direct elections. With the elimination of this element, all political decisions related to changes to the Constitution or the election and dismissal of the president are now more focused on decisions taken by the DPR and DPD which directly elected. On the one hand, this strengthens the principle of direct democracy, but on the other hand, there is concern that the decision-making process will be

more centered on the interests of the political majority, which may ignore the voices of groups previously represented by the Group Representatives. In the context of changing the Constitution, for example, without the votes of certain groups, decisions regarding constitutional amendments could be more vulnerable to the interests of large political parties or dominant groups that have won votes in the election.

In terms of objectivity and fairness, the post-amendment MPR may be better able to make decisions without the influence of certain groups, because its membership is based on direct elections that are more open and transparent. However, this does not necessarily guarantee that the decisions taken will always be fairer or more objective. With the reduction in representation from non-partisan groups or certain groups that do not have political power in the election, decisions taken by the MPR may be more inclined to accommodate the interests of the large parties that dominate Indonesian politics. In the long term, this could affect the MPR's ability to reflect the diversity of voices and make decision-making more susceptible to the interests of powerful political groups, reducing inclusivity in the national political decision-making process.

The main challenge in replacing the role of the *Utusan Golongan* is ensuring that previously underrepresented groups, especially minority groups or marginalized communities, continue to have a voice in the new state structure. In a system that relies entirely on direct elections, these small groups may struggle to gain equal representation, because they do not have enough political support to win seats in the DPR or DPD. Therefore, to ensure diversity remains represented, additional policies are needed that can accommodate the voices of marginalized groups, such as through regional representation mechanisms or special affiliation systems that allow minority voices to be heard. For example, affirmative action policies or special roles for marginalized groups in political decision-making can be effective steps in maintaining a balance of representation and preventing domination by the majority group in the Indonesian political process.

A comparison of the MPR structure before and after the elimination of the Group Representatives shows significant changes in the effectiveness of representation, diversity of voices, and inclusiveness. Before the amendment, the Group Representatives played an important role in ensuring diversity of voices in the MPR, especially from groups that do not have direct representation through general elections, such as professional groups, religions, and certain social interests. However, the existence of the Group Representatives has also been criticized because it is considered not fully democratic and more representative of elite interests. With the elimination of the Group Representatives after the amendment, the MPR structure now relies entirely on the DPR and DPD elected by the people. This certainly increases legitimacy in direct democracy but raises concerns that minority groups or those without political power in elections could lose their representation, thereby reducing diversity and inclusiveness in the political decision-making process.

The elimination of the *Utusan Golongan* has both positive and negative impacts on the quality of representation by the MPR. On the one hand, the new system leads to a purer representation of the will of the people, because all MPR members are elected through direct elections, which strengthens the principle of democracy. However, diversity of voices, this change could risk reducing representation for smaller or less represented groups in direct elections, such as marginalized groups, minorities, and other special interests. Previously, the *Utusan Golongan* gave them a voice in policy-making, something that is now uncertain without special representation. Thus, although representation through direct elections is more democratically legitimate, the elimination of the *Utusan Golongan* could be considered a setback in terms of creating a more inclusive and diverse political representation.

In the context of post-reform democracy, the MPR without the Group Representatives can be said to be more effective in supporting democracy and a legislative process that is more responsive to the people. Political and legislative decisions now better reflect the results of general elections, which means that the decisions taken better reflect the majority vote. This can speed up the legislative process because there is no difference in votes between members who are directly elected and those appointed to represent certain groups. However, the weakness of this system is that the legislative process and decision-making can be more polarized and do not reflect the interests of all levels of society, especially those who are marginalized or do not have political power in direct elections. In this case, the post-amendment MPR has the potential to ignore the voices of minorities previously represented by the Group Representatives.

In the new MPR structure, there are weaknesses that must be considered, especially in ensuring the diversity of voices in the political decision-making process. Without special representation from minority groups or special interests, decisions taken by the MPR can be more dominantly influenced by majority groups or large parties that dominate Indonesian politics. Although this system is more democratic and transparent, fair representation for small or marginal groups remains a major challenge. Therefore, although the new MPR structure has the potential to strengthen democracy, it is necessary to consider additional policies or other mechanisms that can ensure diversity is still represented, so that democratic principles can be maintained in the post-reform Indonesian constitutional system.

CONCLUSION

The elimination of the Group Representatives in the MPR structure after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution brought about major changes in the Indonesian constitutional system, affecting political representation and decision-making. Although this change strengthens the principle of direct democracy by relying on general elections to elect MPR members, there is a risk of reducing the diversity of voices, especially from minority groups and groups that do not have political power in elections. The MPR, which now consists of directly elected members of the DPR and DPD, better reflects the will of the majority, but this could sacrifice representation for groups previously represented by the Group Representatives. Thus, although the new structure is more transparent and democratic, there needs to be more attention to inclusivity and diversity in Indonesia's political representation system. Suggestions that can be given are that the post-reform constitutional system introduces policies or mechanisms that can maintain representation for minority groups or those who are marginalized, previously represented by the Group Representatives. For example, the implementation of an affiliation system or affirmative policies that allow these groups to still have a voice in the political decision-making process can be considered. In addition, it is critical to continue to improve the role of the DPR and DPD in representing all levels of society so that it can create a more inclusive and fair representative system which not only accommodates the interests of the majority, but also respects the diversity that exists in Indonesian society.

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